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STATEMENT OF RELATED PARTIES
Appellant named Dole Food Company, Inc. and Dole Fresh Vegetables,
Inc. as defendants to this action. The court below dismissed these defendants
through summary judgment. (R. 285-86). Appellant is not appealing the granting
of summary judgment to these defendants.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee Dan's Super Markets, Inc. ("Dan's") agrees with the Statement of
Jurisdiction contained in Appellant Marlene Yirak's principal brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION BELOW
1. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment to Dan's on Mrs.
Yirak's product liability claims because Dan's was a passive retailer of the
prepackaged lettuce that allegedly contained a shard of glass?
Appellant correctly states the standard of review for this issue. Appellate
courts review grants of summary judgment for correctness. WebBank v.
American Gen, Annuity Serv. Corp,, 2002 UT 88, 54 P.3d 1139.
This issue was preserved at R. 99-101, Dan's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
2. Did Mrs. Yirak's failure to bring her product liability claims within two
years after knowledge of her harm and her injury constitute an alternative
basis for dismissal of her claims against Dan's?
The appellate court also reviews this issue for correctness.
1

This issue was preserved at R. 247-49, the Memorandum Decision and
Order dismissing Mrs. Yirak's strict liability claim against Dole Food Company,
Inc. and Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc. ("the Dole Defendants").
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES
Regarding the second issue on appeal, the determinative statute is Utah
Code Ann. §78-15-3(1989):
A civil action under this chapter shall be brought within two years from the
time the individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered, or
in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, both the harm and
its cause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court
Below.
Mrs. Yirak brought this product liability action in April 2005 against Dan's
and the Dole Defendants. (R. 1-7) She alleged that on May 20, 2002, she was
eating salad from a prepackaged bag of Dole lettuce that she had purchased at
Dan's a couple of days beforehand. She claimed that while she was eating the
salad, she bit into a sliver of glass that was in the lettuce, resulting in physical
injury. (R. 8-12) Her causes of action were for negligence, strict liability, and
punitive damages. (R. 8-12)
After the parties conducted discovery, Dan's moved for summary judgment
in August 2006, on the ground that it was a passive retailer and therefore could not
be liable to Mrs. Yirak for any defective condition in the prepackaged bag of
lettuce. (R. 99-101) The Dole defendants moved for summary judgment in
2

October 2006, contending that Mrs. Yirak did not file her lawsuit within the twoyear statute of limitations for product liability actions set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-15-3. (R. 152-54)
Judge Randall Skanchy of the Third Judicial District Court heard oral
argument in December 2006, on Dan's Motion for Summary Judgment. On
January 17, 2007, Judge Skanchy granted summary judgment to Dan's on the
ground that Dan's was a passive retailer because Mrs. Yirak "failed to present any
admissible evidence that Dan's knew or should have known that the product
Plaintiff alleges injured her was defective or unreasonably dangerous at the time it
was sold to Plaintiff. . . ." (R. 251-52)
In April 2007, Judge Robert Faust of the Third Judicial District Court
dismissed Mrs. Yirak's negligence claim against the Dole defendants, noting that
Mrs. Yirak "has presented absolutely no evidence to support her claim of
negligence against these defendants." (R. 282-84) Judge Skanchy had previously
dismissed the strict liability claim against the Dole Defendants on January 12,
2007, ruling that Mrs. Yirak had missed the two-year statute of limitations for
product liability actions. (R. 248)
Mrs. Yirak appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Dan's
on May 30, 2007. (R. 291-92)
B. Statement of Facts
On May 18, 2002, Mrs. Yirak purchased a prepackaged bag of Dole lettuce
from her local Dan's grocery store. (R. 102, 139) She did not notice any holes in
3

the bag. (R. 112) Later that day, her children opened the bag and consumed part
of the lettuce without incident. (R. 112)
On May 20, 2002, Mrs. Yirak emptied the rest of the lettuce from the bag
into a bowl and ate it. (R. 116) At some point while eating the salad, her mouth
began bleeding, and she sustained lacerations to her tongue. (R. 116). She spit
out what she was eating, and her sister later found a "thin sliver" of glass in what
she had spit out. (R. 112, 116, 119)
Mrs. Yirak is not aware of any other Dan's customers or any other
consumers in the country who have found glass in a bag of Dole lettuce. (R. 11516) She has since purchased Dole lettuce in prepackaged bags from Dan's and has
not found any foreign objects. (R. 116)
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Dan's produced an
affidavit from store director Thomas Carillo. (R. 128-29) Mr. Carillo testified
that Dan's employees do not manufacture, design, repackage, label or inspect the
Dole's prepackaged lettuce that are sold at the store in question. (R. 128-29)
Moreover, the store had never received a report from a customer other than Mrs.
Yirak that there was glass in a bag of the packaged lettuce. (R. 128-29) Mrs.
Yirak did not dispute any of the facts alleged in Dan's motion for summary
judgment, including those contained in Mr. Carillo's affidavit. (R. 139) She did
not present any evidence that the piece of glass found its way into the bag while in
Dan's possession. (R. 139-42)
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The trial court granted summary judgment to Dan's, stating that "Dan's was
a passive retailer within the meaning of Sarins v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App.
203, 94P.3d301."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT P.

Mrs. Yirak's appeal hinges upon the speculation that the glass sliver

could have entered the bag while in Dan's possession. She argues that Dan's
cannot be considered a passive retailer because of her theory that Dan's could
have caused the product, the prepackaged lettuce, to become defective.
Significantly, Mrs. Yirak has no evidence whatsoever that Dan's put the glass in
the bag of lettuce. She does not even contend that she has any evidence; rather,
she states that her product liability claims should go to a jury so that it can
speculate about how and when the glass entered the bag. Speculation is not
enough to sustain a product liability lawsuit, and it was proper for the trial court to
grant summary judgment to Dan's. Dan's is a passive retailer because it did not
know and had no reason to know that there was a glass sliver in the sealed bag.
POINT IP

Even if it were permissible for a plaintiff to take a case to the jury

simply with conjecture and no evidence, Mrs. Yirak missed the statute of
limitations for product liability lawsuits. The injury occurred on May 20, 2002,
and she was aware at the time of who could potentially be at fault and what caused
her injury. She did not file her lawsuit until April 6, 2005, missing the statutory
deadline by nearly a year. It would therefore be appropriate for this Court to
sustain the summary judgment on this alternative ground.
5

ARGUMENT
POINT I: DAN'S WAS A PASSIVE RETAILER OF THE PREPACKAGED
BAG OF LETTUCE AND IS NOT LIABLE TO MRS, YIRAK IN
PRODUCT LIABILITY,
Mrs. Yirak notes that "[t]his is a products liability action." (Appellant's
Brief, p. 3.) She sued Dan's for negligence and strict liability for selling a product
that allegedly contained a defect, a sliver of glass. The parties agree that Dan's is
a retailer, but they disagree whether Dan's is a passive retailer, such that it has no
liability for the allegedly defective condition in the bag of lettuce.
In opposing Dan's motion for summary judgment and on appeal, Mrs.
Yirak argues that Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 94 P.3d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) has
no applicability here because that case is supposedly limited to cases involving
manufacturing or design defects. (R. 140-41) She additionally argues that Dan's
cannot be a passive retailer "if" the glass entered the bag while in Dan's
possession. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Her two arguments overlap in that both stem from the commonsense notion
that a retailer must do something wrong in order to be held liable in product
liability; if there is no evidence of wrongdoing, a retailer must be dismissed.
Namely, in Sanns, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a retailer cannot be sued
for negligence or strict liability if it is a passive retailer who did not create the
manufacturing or design defect. Id. at 307-08. It defined a "passive retailer" as a
seller of a product who does not know, and has no reason to know, of a defective
condition. Id. at 307-08. Similarly, if there were admissible evidence that the
6

glass entered the bag while in Dan's possession, that could potentially raise the
question of whether Dan's knew or should have known about the defective
condition.1 However, Mrs. Yirak's appeal must fail because she has no absolutely
no evidence that Dan's was responsible for the defective condition of the bag of
lettuce.
A.

SANNS IS APPLICABLE TO BOTH MRS. YIRAK'S
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CLAIMS
1.

Dan's Cannot be Negligent Under the Sarins Analysis
Because It Did Not Owe a Duty of Care to Mrs. Yirak.

In Sarins v. Butterfield Ford, the plaintiff sued Butterfield Ford, a Ford
automobile dealership, for negligence and strict liability. Mr. Sanns was a
passenger in a Ford van that rolled several times, causing him personal injury. Mr.
Sanns also sued Ford for strict liability and negligence. The trial court granted
summary judgment to Butterfield Ford on both claims, and the Utah Court of
Appeals upheld the ruling.
This Court treated each claim separately, dealing with Mr. Sanns'
negligence claim first. The Court of Appeals recognized that the concept of actual
or constructive knowledge of a defect is pertinent in determining whether
Butterfield Ford could be liable for negligence. Citing to House v. Armour of Am.,
Significantly, such evidence would not automatically mean that Dan's knew or should have known about
the glass. For example, if Mrs. Yirak had produced evidence that a rogue customer intentionally inserted
the glass in the bag while it was on the shelf at Dan's, but there was no evidence that Dan's knew of it and
did nothing or that Dan's received any forewarning that this could happen, summary judgment in Dan's
favor would be appropriate. This analysis is similar to that found in premises liability law, where a
storeowner owes no duty as a matter of law to a customer who is injured on the premises if there is no
evidence that the storeowner knew or had reason to know of the dangerous condition on the premises. See,
e.g. Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14, 975 P.2d 467; Cory v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360
(Utah 1973).
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Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court emphasized that "[a] duty
to warn a consumer of a defective product lies with a seller . . . of a product who
'knows or should know of a risk associated with its product.'" Sanns, 94 P.3d at
304. This Court observed that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 401 also
espouses the concept that retailer liability arises when the seller "knows or has
reason to know that the [product] is, or is likely to be, dangerous." Sanns, 94 P.3d
at 304 n.3. If a plaintiff has no evidence that the seller knew or should have
known of a defect with the product, the seller does not owe a duty of care to the
purchaser, and a negligence claim fails as a matter of law. Id. at 304.
Mr. Sanns produced no evidence that Butterfield Ford had actual or
constructive knowledge of a defect in the van. While Butterfield Ford knew the
particular van had a higher center of gravity than most other vehicles, common
sense dictates that most vans have higher centers of gravity than other vehicles,
and there was no evidence that Butterfield Ford knew or should have known that
the particular model of van contained a manufacturing or design defect that made
it susceptible to rollovers. Id. at 304. Because the plaintiff could not show that
the retailer "was anything but a passive retailer of the vehicle," the Court of
Appeals determined that the trial court had correctly granted summary judgment to
Butterfield Ford on the negligence claim because it owed no duty of care as a
matter of law. Id. at 305.
Similarly, Mrs. Yirak has no evidence that Dan's knew or should have
known that the prepackaged bag of lettuce contained a sliver of glass. To her
8

credit, she does not pretend to have such evidence. On the other hand, Dan's
produced testimony from the store director explaining that Dan's does not
manufacture, design, repackage, or inspect the prepackaged bags of lettuce; and
that no other customer had reported glass in a Dole bag before May 2002. In
France v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2007 WL 1795722 (D. Utah), Judge Ted Stewart
granted summary judgment to a motorcycle shop because these circumstances
made it a passive retailer:
It is undisputed that Defendants are passive retailers. Defendants did
not participate in any design, testing, manufacturing or assembly or
warnings in association with this or any motorcycle. . . . It is not
disputed that Defendants performed only routine checks on the bike
and never tampered with or altered the fuel line or any other
component parts.
France v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2007 WL 1795722 at *2.
Sanns governs Mrs. Yirak's claim against Dan's for negligence. Just as it
was appropriate to grant summary judgment to Butterfield Ford for lack of
evidence that it knew or should have known of a defective condition, so the trial
court here correctly dismissed the negligence claim.
2. Dan's Cannot be Strictly Liable Merely for Selling a Product
with an Alleged Defect.
Mrs. Yirak complains that Sanns v. Butterfield has no relevance because it
involved a lawsuit where the plaintiff sought to hold a retailer strictly liable for a
2

Mrs. Yirak faults Dan's on appeal for not inspecting the bags of lettuce, although she does not cite to any
legal authority that might impose a duty upon a grocery store to inspect all of the items it sells for defects.
She offers no details on how a grocery store could practically inspect delicate, packaged and sealed produce
for tiny foreign objects. She does not elaborate on whether a one-time inspection of each item would be
sufficient or whether each item would need to be checked on a daily basis. Finally, she does not suggest
that any inspection of the bag would have actually been fruitful and revealed what she herself describes as a
"tiny sliver." She cannot impose a duty that, with good reason, does not exist in the law.
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manufacturing and design defect. Her complaint raises the question of what type
of defect Mrs. Yirak is claiming. If the glass entered the bag while it was in the
Dole defendants' possession, she ostensibly would say that the product had a
design or manufacturing defect. If the glass entered the bag while it was in Dole's
possession, it is hard to characterize the defect she would be claiming, and she has
never identified the type of defect herself. One might call the defect an "alteration
defect," in that it would have occurred after the design or manufacture of the
product, although Dan's is unaware of any court or other legal authority
recognizing a defect under that name.3
Thus, Mrs. Yirak's contention that Sarins is not applicable instantly exposes
two problems with her strict liability claim. First, it forces her to choose between
alleging a defect that occurred while in Dole's hands and a defect that occurred
while in Dan's hands. However, she concedes that she has no idea when the
alleged defective condition occurred, underscoring the weakness of her case. 'The
glass shard could have entered the bag at any time between the manufacture and
the ultimate purchase of the salad by Mrs. Yirak from Dan's." (Appellant's Brief,
p. 5.) "It's hard to say where the glass came from, where in the process." (R. 299,
p. 8) Second, she may be seeking to hold Dan's strictly liable for a defect that is
not recognized in the law, or at least for a defect that is more appropriately
pursued through a negligence theory than a strict liability theory. See 36A C.J.S.
3

Utah's Product Liability Act states that "fault" can include the alteration of a product, but it addresses
alteration by the "initial user or consumer," not by the retailer. Furthermore, it does not create a separate
category of defect known as "alteration defect." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-5.
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Food § 84 (2007) ("Although a manufacturer may be held strictly liable for
defects in food products it manufacturers and sells, a distributor or retailer who
purchases food products in sealed packages is not liable for non-obvious defects
absent negligence.")
To the extent Mrs. Yirak is claiming that Dan's should be strictly liable for
a defect that occurred while the bagged lettuce was in Dole's control, it is clear
that Sanns precludes this claim. The Court of Appeals explained that due to the
prohibition in the Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37, et
seq., against a party bearing more than its share of fault, "strict liability cannot be
apportioned to Butterfield Ford, a passive seller, and also to Ford." Sanns, 94 P.3d
at 307. This Court therefore established that when a product manufacturer is a
defendant in a lawsuit (as is the case here), a passive retailer cannot be sued for
strict liability. Id. at 307-08.
To the extent Mrs. Yirak is claiming that Dan's should be strictly liable on
the presumption that the glass entered the bag while in its possession, regardless of
whether it was aware of the occurrence, this also runs afoul of the Utah Liability
Reform Act. She has no evidence that Dan's was responsible for the glass
entering the bag, and she therefore would seek to hold Dan's accountable
potentially for someone else's wrongdoing. Moreover, her strict liability claim
rests upon a presumption, and nothing more. She does not know how or when the
glass entered the bag. While strict liability is often described in terms of "liability
without fault," that is not synonymous with absolute liability. She wishes to

pursue Dan's based upon the mere fact that it sold a product that she says
contained a shard of glass. She is essentially requesting that this Court create
absolute liability for retailers, making them absolute insurers of the safety of the
products they sell. This request is not consistent with the Utah Liability Reform
Act or with product liability jurisprudence. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1996) (strict liability is not the equivalent of making
the manufacturer or seller absolutely liable as an insurer of the product and its
use).
Although the plaintiff in Sarins alleged a manufacturing or design defect,
and Mrs. Yirak says she is not alleging either one of these, she cannot explain why
the reasoning in Sarins would be inapplicable to whatever defect she is claiming
here. The Sanns court noted that the passive retailer status derives from the
principle that a nonmanufacturing defendant, who has not been shown to have
created or contributed to the alleged defect, should not be strictly liable when the
manufacturer has been named in the lawsuit. Sanns, 94 P.3d at 306. In other
words, if the retailer has not done anything affirmatively or actively to cause the
dangerous condition, but merely passed the product through the stream of
commerce, it cannot be strictly liable.
The trial court was correct in determining that Dan's was a passive retailer
who cannot be liable in negligence or strict liability. There is no fact in the record
that suggests Dan's had any fault.
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B. MRS. YIRAK'S ALLEGATION OF WRONGDOING BY
DAN'S IS SPECULATION UNSUPPORTED BY ANY
EVIDENCE
Mrs. Yirak states that Dan's cannot be a passive retailer "if the unsafe
condition occurred while the bagged salad was within Dan's possession."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) She asks this Court to reverse the summary judgment so
that a jury can wonder whether the glass might have entered the bag while in
Dan's possession and if so, whether Dan's should be responsible.
Mrs. Yirak has no evidence that the glass entered the bag while under
Dan's control. She freely admits that the glass could have entered the bag at any
time from the point Dole put the lettuce in the bag and sealed it to the point when
she left the store, and that she has no idea how or when it got into the sealed bag.
She did not notice any hole in the sealed bag when she bought the lettuce, and it is
difficult to imagine how glass could have entered the bag at Dan's without making
a hole. Moreover, she does not dispute Dan's evidence that it does not repackage
or alter the bags of Dole lettuce that come prepackaged and sealed to its store.
A party cannot survive a summary judgment motion with mere speculation
that a defendant might have done something wrong. Utah courts have consistently
determined that a jury cannot hear a case where there is no admissible evidence
against a defendant, but simply theories or conjecture that the defendant might
have been at fault. In Spews v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28 (Utah 2004), the
Utah Supreme Court upheld a summary judgment granted to a driver whose
passenger had grabbed the steering wheel and veered into oncoming traffic,
13

injuring the plaintiff. The driver submitted an affidavit that the passenger grabbed
the steering wheel without warning during an argument. The plaintiff did not
contest the affidavit but instead maintained that the driver could have been
negligent for failing to reduce speed or take evasive action after the passenger
grabbed the steering wheel. The court explained that "[w]hile such conclusions
may be theoretically possible, [plaintiff] created no genuine issue of fact on these
issues because it failed to introduce any evidence from which a jury could arrive at
such conclusions." Speros, 98 P.3d at 33 (emphasis in original); see also
Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 P.2d 1382, 1388 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(affirming cited line of Utah cases stating that unsubstantiated assertions cannot
defeat summary judgment motion).
Similarly, Mrs. Yirak cannot pursue a lawsuit against Dan's when she has
absolutely no evidence that Dan's did anything but innocently sell a bag of sealed
lettuce. She has no evidence that the sliver of glass got into the bag while in Dan's
possession or otherwise due to some act or omission of Dan's.
POINT II: ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT COULD UPHOLD THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO FILE THE LAWSUIT
WITHIN THE STATUTORY DEADLINE,
The trial court dismissed Mrs. Yirak's strict liability claim against the Dole
defendants because she failed to file her lawsuit within the two-year statute of
limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3. Mrs. Yirak suffered her injury
on May 20, 2002, when she bit into salad allegedly containing a sliver of glass.
She knew at the time what caused her injury and who she could potentially sue for
14

it. She nonetheless waited until April 2005, to file her Complaint, after the statute
of limitations expired.
The trial court did not refer to § 78-15-3 as an alternative basis for the
dismissal of the strict liability claim against Dan's, but this Court may affirm
summary judgment on any basis found in the trial court record. Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1997). There is no
reason why the statute of limitations argument that was successful for the Dole
defendants would be inapplicable to Dan's.
Not only is the statute of limitations an undeniable basis for affirming the
dismissal of the strict liability claim against Dan's, it is a basis for affirming the
dismissal of the negligence claim, as well. Although Judge Faust felt that § 78-153 does not apply to products liability claims for negligence, Judge Skanchy, who
first presided over the lawsuit, felt that it did. (R. 237) Although Mrs. Yirak
admits that her lawsuit is a product liability lawsuit, she nonetheless argued to the
trial court that her negligence claim should be covered by the four-year statute of
limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (3) "for relief not otherwise provided by
law."
In Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, 48 P.3d 218, 225-26, the court
explained that the term "product liability" includes claims for design or
manufacturing defect, negligence or strict liability:
Alternative theories are available to prove different categories of
defective product, including negligence, strict liability, or implied
warranty of merchantability . . . . Thus, allegations of negligence
15

contained in a products liability claim do not transform the claim
into one for ordinary negligence.
Bishop, 48 P.3d at 226. The court in Strickland v. General Motors Corporation,
852 F.Supp. 956, 959 (D. Utah 1994) similarly held that "all claims against a
manufacturer, based on a defective product" are subject to the two-year limitations
period in Utah Code § 78-15-3. The Utah Product Liability Act provides a twoyear statute of limitations for "a civil action under this chapter . . . ." Utah Code §
78-15-3. Mrs. Yirak acknowledges that her lawsuit is a product liability lawsuit,
and her claims for negligence and strict liability are both subject to the same
limitations period.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
Dan's was a passive retailer. It simply sold the sealed bag of Dole lettuce,
without altering or tampering with it. It did not know or have reason to know that
the bag contained a sliver of glass. The trial court correctly granted summary
judgment. Dan's asks that this Court affirm the summary judgment.
DATED this 3 D

day of November, 2007.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

0< f.f- fyL. o
Xtulianne P. Blanch
(^Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee
Dan's Super Markets, Inc.
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